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INTRODUCTION 
This is an initial brief filed by the intervenor-appellee-cross-
appellant, the State of New Union, in response to the order of this 
court dated September 29, 2010. References to the problem are 
abbreviated as follows: ―R.‖ = Problem. References to the 
documents cited in the Summary of the Record are abbreviated as 
follows: ―Rec. doc.‖ = Record Document. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Subject-matter jurisdiction is a contested issue in this case. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Twelfth Circuit has 
jurisdiction to hear appeals from any final decision of the United 
States District Court for the District of New Union, including 
decisions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
(2006). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
Pursuant to its statutory mandate under the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (―RCRA‖), the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (―EPA‖) approved the State of 
New Union‘s hazardous waste program in lieu of a federal 
program in 1986. (Rec. doc. 2, p. 1). EPA made this determination 
after finding New Union possessed adequate resources to fully 
administer and enforce the program. Id. 
Recently, state budget constraints have resulted in 
alterations to New Union‘s program.  In response to these 
changes, the New Union Department of Environmental 
Protection (―DEP‖) has sought to administer the program more 
efficiently. Among other things, the New Union DEP asked EPA 
to work in tandem with its regulators to maintain the quality of 
the New Union program.  (Rec. doc. 5 for 2009, p. 23).  Moreover, 
the New Union legislature transferred some state environmental 
regulatory authority to the New Union Railroad Commission.  
(Rec. doc. 5 for 2000, pp. 103-105).  Finally, the New Union 
legislature passed a law focusing the efforts of the state 
hazardous waste program on Pollutant X, one of the most potent 
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and toxic chemicals to human health.  (Rec. doc. 5 for 2000, pp. 
105–07). 
On January 5, 2009, the Citizens for Regulation and the 
Environment, Inc. (―CARE‖) served a petition on the 
Administrator of the EPA.  (R. at 4).  The petition requested that 
EPA commence proceedings to withdraw its approval of New 
Union‘s hazardous waste program.  Id.  EPA has not yet acted on 
this petition.  Id. 
Dissatisfied with EPA‘s delay, CARE filed suit in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of New Union on January 4, 2010.  
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 6972, CARE sought either an injunction 
requiring EPA to act on the petition, or judicial review of EPA‘s 
―constructive denial‖ of the petition and ―constructive 
determination‖ that the program met RCRA‘s requirements.  The 
State of New Union filed an unopposed motion to intervene, 
which the district court granted. 
At the same time it filed the above action in the district 
court, CARE filed a petition for review with the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Twelfth Circuit.  CARE sought judicial review of 
EPA‘ s ―constructive denial‖ and ―constructive determination‖ on 
the same grounds.  New Union filed an unopposed motion to 
intervene in that case as well.  This court granted the motion and 
stayed resolution of the claim pending the outcome of the district 
court action. 
In an order dated June 2, 2010, the district court, responding 
to the parties‘ cross-motions for summary judgment, denied 
CARE‘s motion for summary judgment and granted New Union‘s 
motion for summary judgment.  (R. at 9).  Each of the parties 
subsequently filed notices of appeal with this court. (R. at 1).  In 
addition, CARE now asks this court to lift its earlier stay and 
consolidate the two actions.  (R. at 1–2). 
On September 29, 2010, this Court ordered all parties to brief 
seven issues.  (R. at 3).  This timely response on behalf of the 
State of New Union follows. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Whether RCRA § 7002(a)(2) provides jurisdiction for district 
courts to order EPA to act on CARE‘s petition for revocation of 
EPA‘s approval of New Union‘s hazardous waste program, filed 
pursuant to RCRA § 7004. 
Whether 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides jurisdiction for district 
courts to order EPA to act on CARE‘s petition for revocation of 
EPA‘s approval of New Union‘s hazardous waste program, filed 
under 5 U.S.C. § 553(e). 
Whether EPA‘s failure to act on CARE‘s petition that EPA 
initiate proceedings to consider withdrawing approval of New 
Union‘s hazardous waste program under RCRA § 3006(e) 
constituted a constructive denial of that petition and a 
constructive determination that New Union‘s program continued 
to meet criteria for program approval under RCRA § 3006(b), both 
subject to judicial review under RCRA §§ 7002(a)(2) and 7006(b). 
Whether, assuming the answer to issue III is positive and the 
answer to either or both of issues I and II is positive, this court 
should lift the stay in C.A. No. 18-2010 and proceed with judicial 
review of EPA‘s constructive actions or should the court remand 
the case to the lower court to order EPA to initiate and complete 
proceedings to consider withdrawal of its approval of New Union‘s 
hazardous waste program. 
Whether, assuming this court proceeds to the merits of 
CARE‘s challenge, EPA must withdraw its approval of New 
Union‘s program because its resources and performance fail to 
meet RCRA‘s approval criteria. 
Whether, assuming this court proceeds to the merits of 
CARE‘s challenge, EPA must withdraw its approval of New 
Union‘s program because the New Union 2000 Environmental 
Regulatory Adjustment Act effectively withdraws railroad 
hazardous waste facilities from regulation. 
Whether, assuming this court proceeds to the merits of 
CARE‘s challenge, EPA must withdraw its approval of New 
Union‘s program because the New Union 2000 Environmental 
Regulatory Adjustment Act renders New Union‘s program not 
equivalent to the federal RCRA program, inconsistent with the 
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federal program and other approved state programs, or in 
violation of the Commerce Clause. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Twelfth Circuit Court of Appeals reviews a district 
court‘s dismissal of a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
de novo.  Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th 
Cir.2009). If this court consolidates this action, this court reviews 
a district court‘s grant of summary judgment de novo. Haynes v. 
Williams, 392 F.3d 478, 484 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
RCRA‘s citizen suit provision allows any person to bring an 
action against the EPA Administrator where there is alleged a 
failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty which is 
not discretionary. RCRA requires the EPA Administrator to take 
action after a person petitions the Administrator for the 
promulgation, amendment, or repeal of any regulation.  RCRA 
does not require the Administrator to take action after a person 
petitions the administrator for the promulgation, amendment, or 
repeal of any order.  Such action is discretionary. 
CARE argues its petition requesting that EPA commence 
proceedings to withdraw its approval of New Union‘s hazardous 
waste program falls under a nondiscretionary provision of RCRA. 
However, program approvals are orders, rather than 
rulemakings, under RCRA. Therefore, because the Administrator 
has discretion to act on petitions dealing with orders, RCRA‘s 
citizen suit provision does not provide a jurisdictional basis for a 
district court to order EPA to act on CARE‘s petition. 
Furthermore, EPA‘s failure to respond to CARE‘s petition is 
not a ―constructive denial‖ of the petition or a ―constructive 
determination‖ that New Union‘s program is in compliance. 
RCRA lacks time-specific statutory deadlines for EPA‘s response. 
Rather, Congress granted EPA the discretion to address petitions 
as the agency sees fit, and to conserve its limited resources. 
Where there is no time-specific duty to respond, a 364-day delay 
cannot be construed as a constructive denial of a petition or a 
constructive determination of compliance. The decision to initiate 
5
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withdrawal proceedings is, under RCRA, discretionary with EPA. 
Discretionary statutes such as RCRA give agencies the flexibility 
to respond within a ―reasonable‖ time, a term that has been 
interpreted to equate to several years or even decades. EPA‘s 
delay of just under a year is not such an unreasonable inaction or 
delay. When EPA has not yet made such a determination or 
denial, there is no basis for the district court‘s review. 
Even if this court disagrees and finds that EPA‘s delay is a 
―constructive‖ denial of CARE‘s petition, the court should remand 
the issue to EPA for initiation and exhaustion of the statutory 
administrative remedies. New Union has a right under RCRA to 
notice, a fair hearing, a compiled agency record, and an 
opportunity to comply with RCRA‘s framework.  RCRA‘s own 
regulatory scheme and the basic demands of due process demand 
that this court refrain from initiating a substantive review of the 
New Union RCRA program. 
If this court nevertheless decides to overturn the decision of 
the district court and proceed to the merits of CARE‘s challenge, 
EPA should not be forced to withdraw its approval of the New 
Union RCRA program.  The withdrawal of a state program‘s 
approval is an extreme and drastic remedy that requires EPA to 
fill the gap left by the withdrawn state program, and that 
undermines the letter and spirit of cooperative federalism 
embodied by RCRA. 
This is particularly true when New Union‘s program is 
substantially in compliance with RCRA. New Union‘s program 
has not failed to issue permits, inspect facilities, or otherwise 
exercise its control over hazardous waste management as 
required by RCRA. New Union, in partnership with EPA, has 
demonstrated the ability to enforce its RCRA program via civil 
suits and other remedies. There is no ―failure‖ in regulation or 
enforcement that would constitute a ―failure‖ of the New Union 
program or subject it to withdrawal. 
CARE next challenges the New Union program on the basis 
of the 2000 Amendments to the Railroad Regulatory Act. 
However, CARE misunderstands the role of the federal 
authorities in RCRA‘s federal-state partnership scheme. These 
amendments do not create a regulatory gap that would subject 
the New Union program to withdrawal—enforcement authority is 
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simply moved to another state body, with EPA retaining civil 
enforcement authority in case the Railroad Commission fails to 
adequately enforce the environmental law. Federal authorities 
are also empowered to enforce state permit requirements and 
bring criminal charges under RCRA, thus filling any potential 
gap created by the RRA Amendments. There is no basis for 
withdrawal. 
Finally, New Union‘s regulation of Pollutant X is exactly the 
sort of permissible more-stringent regulation, based in 
considerations of human health and environmental protection, 
that states are allowed under RCRA. EPA is not required to 
withdraw its approval. The regulation of Pollutant X does not ban 
the movement of hazardous waste across New Union‘s border, 
and does not constitute a ―prohibition‖ on the treatment, storage, 
or disposal of hazardous waste. The regulation is not facially 
discriminatory, and does not violate the dormant Commerce 
Clause under the Supreme Court‘s balancing test for legislation 
based on permissible concerns. CARE‘s petition should be denied 
and the New Union RCRA program should be upheld. 
ARGUMENT 
I.   THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT 
RCRA SECTION 7002 DOES NOT PROVIDE A 
JURISDICTIONAL BASIS FOR A DISTRICT 
COURT TO ORDER EPA TO ACT ON CARE’S 
PETITION, FILED UNDER RCRA SECTION 7004, 
FOR REVOCATION OF EPA’S APPROVAL OF 
NEW UNION’S HAZARDOUS WASTE PROGRAM. 
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (―RCRA‖) 
provides a comprehensive federal program for the management of 
hazardous waste from ―cradle to grave.‖ However, RCRA allows 
states to establish their own hazardous waste programs, in lieu of 
the federal program, after obtaining EPA‘s approval. See 42 
U.S.C. § 6926(b). Indeed, the statute makes clear that states, like 
New Union, are the preferred authorities for implementation and 
enforcement of the federal program. Id. 
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In order to ensure compliance, RCRA‘s citizen suit provision 
allows any person to bring an action ―against the Administrator 
where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform 
any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with 
the Administrator.‖  42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(2). However, contrary to 
CARE‘s claims, this section does not provide the district court a 
jurisdictional basis to order EPA to act on its petition to withdraw 
approval from New Union‘s program. Rather, EPA has discretion 
to decide whether to act. The decision of the District Court to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was correct, and should be upheld. 
A. CARE’s petition was not properly submitted under 
RCRA Section 7004 because withdrawal of a state 
program’s approval is an order, not a rule. 
On January 5, 2009, CARE filed its petition with the EPA 
pursuant to RCRA Section 7004 to force EPA to begin proceedings 
to withdraw New Union‘s program approval. (R. at 4). Section 
7004 provides, ―[a]ny person may petition the Administrator for 
the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of any regulation . . . 
.Within a reasonable time following receipt of such petition, the 
Administrator shall take action with respect to such petition.‖  42 
U.S.C. § 6974. 
However, RCRA does not define ―regulation‖ as used in 
Section 7004.  Therefore, this court should look to the 
Administrative Procedure Act (―APA‖) for guidance.  See, e.g., 
Watts v. SEC, 482 F.3d 501, 505 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (looking to APA 
definitions to interpret term used in federal securities laws). 
The APA provides definitions of agency substantive ―rules‖ 
and ―orders‖ as used in the APA. Section 551(4) defines ―rule‖ as: 
the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or 
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, 
interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the 
organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency 
and includes the approval or prescription for the future of rates, 
wages, corporate or financial structures or reorganizations 
thereof, prices, facilities, appliances, services or allowances 
therefore or of valuations, costs, or accounting, or practices 
bearing on any of the foregoing[.] 
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―Rulemaking‖ is defined in section 551(5) as ―agency process 
for formulating, amending, or repealing a rule[.]‖ 
―Order‖ is defined in section 551(6) as ―the whole or a part of 
a final disposition, whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or 
declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter other than rule 
making but including licensing[.]‖  (emphasis added). 
―License‖ is defined in section 551(8) as ―the whole or a part 
of an agency permit, certificate, approval, registration, charter, 
membership, statutory exemption or other form of permission.‖ 
―Licensing‖ is defined in section 551(9) as ―agency process 
respecting the grant, renewal, denial, revocation, suspension, 
annulment, withdrawal, limitation, amendment, modification, or 
conditioning of a license.‖ 
EPA argues the APA definitions of ―rule‖ or ―rulemaking‖ 
apply to the RCRA permit approval process.  Because ―[c]ourts 
and Congress treat the terms ―regulation‖ and ―rule‖ as 
interchangeable and synonymous,‖ EPA would have this court 
apply the definition of ―rule‖ in 551(4) or ―rulemaking‖ in 551(5).  
Nat’l Treas. Emps. Union v. Weise, 100 F.3d 157, 160 (D.C. Cir. 
1996).  However, ―[w]here there is no clear intention otherwise, a 
specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general 
one.‖  Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550–51 (1974).  Here, the 
APA definitions of ―order‖ and ―license‖ more closely resemble the 
RCRA permitting process than the definitions of ―rule‖ or 
―rulemaking.‖ 
In approving the New Union program, EPA was issuing a 
―permit.‖  See 42 U.S.C. § 6925.  Under 551(8), a permit is a form 
of ―license.‖  According to 551(9), an agency issues a ―license‖ 
after conducting a ―licensing.‖  A ―licensing,‖ under 551(6) is an 
―order.‖  Therefore, because an ―order‖ is ―a matter other than 
rulemaking,‖ the RCRA permitting process cannot be a 
―rulemaking‖ and CARE‘s petition was not submitted under 42 
U.S.C. § 6974.  See 5 U.S.C. § 551(4). 
There is an additional reason for this court to reject EPA‘s 
interpretation of the APA.  Because Congress did not direct the 
EPA to implement the APA, EPA‘s interpretation is not entitled 
to Chevron deference. See Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 
638 (1990) (a precondition to Chevron deference is a congressional 
delegation of administrative authority).  In addition, ―ambiguities 
9
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in the APA are not properly viewed as congressional delegations 
to the administrative agencies, since the very purpose of the APA 
is to constrain these agencies.‖  Air North Am. v. Dep’t of Transp., 
937 F.2d 1427, 1436–37 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Wong Yang Sung 
v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950)).  As such, this court is not bound 
to accept EPA‘s strained interpretation of ―rule‖ and 
―rulemaking.‖ 
When interpreting ambiguous procedural terms in a statute 
an agency is authorized to administer, some courts of appeals 
have not stopped with the APA definitions.  See, e.g., New Mexico 
Envtl. Imp. Div. v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 825, 829 (10th Cir. 1986).  
They have also looked to ―the character of a proceeding to 
determine whether it is a rule or an order.‖  Id. 
Here, as the district court rightly noted, ―[EPA‘s] action has 
the characteristics of an order. EPA is applying facts to law; 
determining whether the program submitted by New Union met 
the criteria of RCRA and EPA‘s regulations under RCRA.‖  (R. 6). 
Two Supreme Court cases elaborate on the distinction 
between a ―rule‖ and an ―order,‖ Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 
373 (1908) and Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 
239 U.S. 441 (1915).  The Londoner/Bi-Metallic doctrine 
generally holds that ―orders‖ are usually adjudicative in nature 
and apply to a particular group, whereas ―rules‖ are more 
legislative in nature and have general applicability.  When EPA 
approved New Union‘s program, it was acting in a way that 
affected only the New Union program. EPA‘s approval did not 
have any general applicability. 
Therefore, because ―EPA‘s approval or disapproval of New 
Union‘s program was an order rather than a rulemaking, it is not 
subject to petition under section [6974]‖ and 42 U.S.C. § 6972 
does not provide a jurisdictional basis for a district court to order 
EPA to act on CARE‘s petition.  (R. 7). 
B. CARE may have had a cause of action under RCRA 
Section 7006, however it is now time barred. 
Because a program approval is an ―order‖ rather than a 
―regulation,‖ CARE‘s petition could not have been filed under 
Section 7004. 42 U.S.C. § 6974. Instead, RCRA Section 7006, the 
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provision governing review of approvals of state programs, 
applies.  That section provides: 
[r]eview of the Administrator‘s action (1) in issuing, denying, 
modifying, or revoking any permit under section 6925 of this title 
. . . may be had by any interested person in the Circuit Court of 
Appeals of the United States for the Federal judicial district in 
which such person resides or transacts such business upon 
application by such person. 
42 U.S.C. § 6976. 
In addition to providing CARE the exclusive means by which 
it could challenge the New Union permit, Section 7006 requires 
that any petition for review be filed within ninety days.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 6976(b) (―[a]ny such application shall be made within 
ninety days from the date of such issuance, denial, modification, 
revocation, grant, or withdrawal, or after such date only if such 
application is based solely on grounds which arose after such 
ninetieth day.‖). 
Because ―the facts CARE alleges in support of its argument 
that New Union‘s program no longer meets the approval criteria 
occurred more than ninety days ago,‖ CARE‘s potential cause of 
action under RCRA Section 7006(b) is time barred. (R. at 7). 
II.  THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT 
THERE IS NO FEDERAL QUESTION 
JURISDICTION FOR A DISTRICT COURT TO 
ORDER EPA TO ACT ON A PETITION FOR 
REVOCATION OF EPA’S APPROVAL OF NEW 
UNION’S HAZARDOUS WASTE PROGRAM. 
CARE alternatively argues 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides 
jurisdiction for a district court to order EPA to act on its petition.  
However, ―[s]ection 1331 does not independently or separately 
confer jurisdiction.  Rather, the plaintiffs must identify a statute 
or law of the United States on which their claims are based.‖ Gem 
Cnty. Mosquito Abatement Dist. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 398 F. 
Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2005).  Here, CARE asserts 5 U.S.C. § 
553(e) provides this basis. However, this section is inapplicable to 
CARE‘s petition. 
11
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Section 553(e) states ―[e]ach agency shall give an interested 
person the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or 
repeal of a rule.‖  But as found by the District Court and 
discussed in the analysis above, CARE petitioned EPA to 
reconsider an order, not a rule.  Because CARE is challenging an 
order rather than a rule, section 553(e) does not apply and cannot 
give CARE a basis for its claim. Absent this independent 
statutory basis, there is no federal question jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331. 
Furthermore, judicial review under the APA is limited to 
either review specifically authorized in a substantive statute, or 
―final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy 
in a court.‖  5 U.S.C. § 704.  The ―form of proceeding for judicial 
review is the special statutory review proceeding relevant to the 
subject matter in a court specified by statute or, in the absence or 
inadequacy thereof, any applicable form of legal action. . . .‖  5 
U.S.C. § 703. 
Here, RCRA itself mandates a special statutory review 
procedure for precisely the type of claim CARE raised.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 6976.  Because CARE chose not to exercise its rights 
under this section, its claim is now time barred.  Rather than 
affirm CARE‘s eleventh hour attempts to bring a cause of action, 
this court should act in accordance with the plain language of 
RCRA and uphold the district court‘s dismissal of CARE‘s claim 
for lack of jurisdiction. 
III.  THERE HAS BEEN NEITHER A CONSTRUCTIVE 
DENIAL OF CARE’S PETITION NOR A 
CONSTRUCTIVE DETERMINATION OF NEW 
UNION’S COMPLIANCE FOR THIS COURT TO 
REVIEW 
CARE erroneously contends that EPA‘s failure to respond to 
the petition to initiate withdrawal proceedings is a ―constructive 
denial‖ of CARE‘s petition and a ―constructive determination‖ 
that New Union is in compliance with RCRA. Based upon this 
string of inferences, CARE claims it is entitled to judicial review 
under RCRA Section 7006. CARE‘s argument is without merit 
because neither of the statutes CARE bases its petition on 
provide time-specific deadlines for EPA to respond. Without a 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol1/iss1/6
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time-specific deadline mandated by RCRA or the APA, there is no 
basis for this court to decide that a ―constructive‖ denial or 
determination has been made. Moreover, EPA‘s inaction is not an 
unreasonable agency delay. 
A. RCRA Section 7004 and APA Section 553 do not 
impose a time-specific deadline upon the EPA to 
answer petitions, therefore there was no 
“constructive denial” of CARE’s petition. 
Even if this court decides CARE‘s petition was properly filed 
as a challenge to a ―rule,‖ EPA‘s delay in responding to the 
petition does not constitute a ―constructive denial‖ of the petition 
that would be subject to judicial review under RCRA Section 
7006. 
RCRA section 7004 provides, ―[a]ny person may petition the 
Administrator for the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of any 
regulation . . . . [w]ithin a reasonable time following receipt of 
such petition, the Administrator shall take action with respect to 
such petition.‖  42 U.S.C. § 6974 (emphasis added). Similarly, 
APA section 553 provides, ―[e]ach agency shall give an interested 
person the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or 
repeal of a rule.‖ 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (emphasis added). However, 
the statutory right to petition the Administrator does not grant a 
statutory right to a response in a particular time frame. EPA‘s 
silence for 364 days cannot trigger a deadline that does not exist, 
and does not mean that the delay is a ―constructive denial.‖ 
Therefore, CARE‘s reliance on a ―constructive denial‖ theory is 
unfounded. Cf. Scott v. City of Hammond, 741 F.2d 992 (7th Cir. 
1984) (holding that prolonged silence and a ―refusal to act‖ by a 
state may amount to the ―constructive submission‖ of a 
regulatory change under the Clean Water Act, which then places 
a duty upon the Administrator to approve or disapprove within 
thirty days). 
In Scott, it was the Clean Water Act‘s short statutory 
deadlines that created the duty to respond and allowed the court 
to characterize the state‘s prolonged silence as a refusal to act. 
See id. While New Union concedes that under RCRA section 
3006(e), ―[t]he administrator shall respond in writing to any 
petition to commence withdrawal proceedings,‖ the Administrator 
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06 Intervenor 4/24/2011  2:32 AM 
2011] BEST BRIEF: INTERVENORS 173 
 
is not under a duty to approve or disapprove CARE‘s petition in a 
fixed amount of time absent short statutory deadlines. 
―Mere inaction by [an agency] cannot be transmuted by 
petitioners into an order rejecting their petition. Administrative 
action is not reviewable as an order ‗unless and until [it] 
impose[s] an obligation, den[ies] a right, or fix[es] some legal 
relationship as a consummation of the administrative process.‘ ― 
Am. Rivers v. FERC, 170 F.3d 896, 897 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting 
Cities of Riverside & Colton v. FERC, 765 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th 
Cir. 1985)). The mere passage of time where there is no fixed time 
to respond does not constitute a ―constructive denial‖ of CARE‘s 
petition. See 40 C.F.R. § 271.23 (2010). 
B. Since RCRA Section 3006 does not impose a time-
specific deadline, there has been no “constructive 
determination” that New Union is in compliance for 
this Court to review. 
RCRA section 3006(e), withdrawal of authorization, provides: 
Whenever the Administrator determines after public hearing that 
a State is not administering and enforcing a program authorized 
under this section in accordance with requirements of this 
section, he shall so notify the State and, if appropriate corrective 
action is not taken within a reasonable time, not to exceed ninety 
days, the Administrator shall withdraw authorization of such 
program and establish a Federal program pursuant to this 
subchapter. 
42 U.S.C. §6926(e)(2010) (emphasis added). This section places 
discretion with EPA to decide when to withdraw authorization of 
a state‘s RCRA program, because Congress did not provide a 
time-specific deadline. See Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 
791 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (―it is highly improbable that a deadline will 
be nondiscretionary . . . if it exists only by reason of an inference 
drawn from the overall statutory framework‖). But see Maine v. 
Thomas, 874 F.2d 883, 888 (1st Cir. 1989) (adopting the D.C. 
Circuit‘s rule that provisions that do include explicit deadlines 
should create non-discretionary duties). Not only does the 
Administrator have discretion regarding the appropriate 
timeframe to respond to petitions, she also has the discretion to 
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choose when to make a determination if a state is in compliance 
or not.  Since there was no time-specific deadline for the 
Administrator to make this ―determination,‖ the ―constructive 
determination‖ doctrine of Scott is inapplicable 
Other cases arising under the Clean Water Act clarify why 
EPA‘s inaction on CARE‘s petition does not constitute a 
―constructive determination‖ that New Union is in compliance. 
See Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. EPA, 268 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 
1263 (D. Or. 2003). In Northwest Environmental Advocates, the 
court held the Administrator had a duty to review a continued 
implementation plan under the CWA and then make a 
determination if a revised standard was necessary or not. 
However, because the Administrator was given discretion to 
choose when to promulgate revised standards under the statute, 
a ―constructive submission‖ theory was inapplicable. Id. 
Similarly, the discretion vested in the Administrator under RCRA 
belies CARE‘s theory that inaction on a petition is a constructive 
approval. 
The enforcement regulations further emphasize the 
discretion of the Administrator over program compliance 
determinations under RCRA: 
―[t]he administrator may order the commencement of withdrawal 
proceedings on his or her own initiative or in response to a 
petition from an interested person alleging failure of the State to 
comply with the requirements of [section 6926]. . .‖ 
40 C.F.R. § 271.23. See Texas Disposal Sys. Landfill Inc. v. EPA, 
No. 09-502704, 2010 WL 1838724, at *1 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(withdrawal of authorization of a state‘s hazardous waste 
program is committed to the discretion of the Administrator). 
Further, ―judicial imposition of any deadline upon EPA for 
construing a state‘s inaction as a ‗constructive submission‘ would 
necessarily be premised only by inference from the deadlines in 
the statute, and that even if such an inference were plausible, it 
would be unwarranted as it would unduly limit EPA‘s flexibility 
in addressing [] compliance.‖ Am. Canoe Ass’n, Inc. v. EPA, 30 F. 
Supp. 2d 908, 920 (E.D. Va. 1998).  New Union DEP‘s annual 
reports coupled with EPA‘s inaction on CARE‘s petition are 
insufficient to constitute a ―constructive determination‖ of 
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compliance by the Administrator, and are therefore not 
reviewable under RCRA Section 7006. 
C. Judicial review is unnecessary because there has 
not been an unreasonable agency delay. 
Finally, there is no basis for judicial scrutiny of EPA‘s failure 
to respond to CARE‘s petition when there has been no 
unreasonable delay or other justification for this to force the 
agency to act. ―[A] fundamental infirmity in an agency 
proceeding, justifying interlocutory relief, may occur when an 
agency unduly delays the resolution of a matter committed to it.‖ 
In re City of Virginia Beach, 42 F.3d 881, 885 (4th Cir. 1994) 
(emphasis added) (citing Telecomm. Research & Action Ctr. v. 
FCC, 750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). There is no such fundamental 
infirmity in the agency proceeding here. 
In City of Virginia Beach, the court determined that FERC‘s 
environmental review was statutorily authorized. Therefore, 
what was left unanswered was whether the agency delay was 
egregious. The court stated, ―when action sought to be reviewed is 
one that is committed to discretion, it cannot be said that a 
litigant‘s right to a particular result is clear and indisputable and 
relief by a writ of mandamus would ordinarily not be available.‖ 
Id.at 884 (quoting Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 
33, 36 (1980) (internal quotations omitted)). The Fourth Circuit 
opined that ―we cannot conclude that the delays have been so 
egregious as to meet the demanding standard required for us to 
interfere with the agency process through a writ of mandamus‖ 
despite a delay of four and a half years. Id. at 886. 
Similarly, in the state withdrawal proceedings at issue here, 
the regulations require the Administrator to ―respond in writing 
to any petition to commence withdrawal proceedings,‖ but the 
time-frame is committed to discretion. For this sort of 
discretionary action, a mere 364-day delay is not unreasonable. 
See 40 C.F.R. § 271.23. The D.C. Circuit observed that courts 
rarely compel an agency to make an immediate decision. ―Rather, 
courts allow agencies to set their own priorities on account of 
their ‗unique-and authoritative-position‘ to ‗allocate their 
resources in the optimal way.‖ See Orion Reserves Ltd. P’ship v. 
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Kempthorne, 516 F. Supp. 2d 8, 11 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting In re 
Barr Labs. Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). 
Although a limit can be placed on the reasonableness of 
agency action, EPA has not surpassed this limit. The D.C. Circuit 
stated that there is no per se rule on how long is too long for 
agency inaction. Further, reasonableness can be defined as a time 
period encompassing months or occasionally a year or two, but 
certainly not decades. In re Am. Rivers & Idaho Rivers United, 
372 F.3d 413, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (since agency did not offer 
explanation for delay, six year delay on a mandatory agency 
action to grant or deny a petition was unreasonable); MCI 
Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 627 F.2d 322, 340 (D.C. Cir.1980). 
Whereas here, the EPA‘s delay in responding to CARE‘s petition, 
364-days, does not surpass the threshold of reasonableness and 
does not demand judicial intervention. 
IV.  THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD NOT LIFT 
THE STAY, AND INSTEAD SHOULD REMAND 
THE CASE TO THE DISTRICT COURT TO ORDER 
EPA TO INITIATE PROCEEDINGS 
Even assuming this court has jurisdiction, and that inaction 
by EPA can be seen as a ―constructive denial‖ of CARE‘s petition 
or a ―constructive determination‖ that New Union is in 
compliance, the case is not ripe for review in this court. One of 
the main functions of the ripeness doctrine is to provide an 
agency a ―full opportunity. . . to correct errors or modify positions 
in the course of a proceeding.‖ Pub. Citizen Health Research 
Group v. Comm’r, FDA, 740 F.2d 21, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1984). As the 
Supreme Court stated: 
The basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of 
premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract 
disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect 
the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative 
decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way 
by the challenging parties. The problem is best seen in a twofold 
aspect, requiring us to evaluate both the fitness of the issues for 
judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding 
court consideration. 
17
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Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–49 (1967). The Court 
should not intercede until EPA has had a chance to make formal 
decision, using the complex regulatory process in place, and until 
New Union has a chance to comply with any final order from the 
EPA. 
A. The question of New Union’s compliance with RCRA 
is not subject to review in this Court because EPA’s 
decision not to invoke its administrative process is 
discretionary and not reviewable. 
[A]n agency decision not to enforce often involves a complicated 
balancing of a number of factors which are particularly within its 
expertise. Thus, an agency must not only assess whether a 
violation has occurred, but whether agency resources are best 
spent on this violation or another, whether the agency is likely to 
succeed if it acts, whether the particular enforcement action best 
fits the agency‘s overall policies, and indeed, whether the agency 
has enough resources to undertake the action at all. 
Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031,1046–47 (D.C. 
Cir. 1979). 
Generally, an agency‘s decision not to bring an enforcement 
action is presumptively unreviewable by a court. See Heckler v. 
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985). This presumption may be 
rebutted only when the substantive statute at issue provides 
guidelines for the court to follow ―in exercising its enforcement 
powers‖ over the agency. Id.at 33.Since the substantive statute 
and regulations lack time-specific guidance for the court, EPA‘s 
delay is an unreviewable agency decision and does not become 
reviewable until EPA has commenced its proceedings and New 
Union has had a chance to come into compliance. 
Similarly, under the APA, an agency‘s decision not to invoke 
an enforcement mechanism provided by statute is not ordinarily 
subject to judicial review. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)). See also 
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 832 (―[A]n agency‘s decision not to 
take enforcement action should be presumed immune from 
judicial review under 701(a)(2).‖). As in Texas Disposal, CARE 
petitions EPA based on RCRA‘s withdrawal provisions. The case 
law is again instructive. In Texas Disposal, a landfill company 
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petitioned EPA to withdraw its authorization of Texas‘s federally 
approved hazardous waste program. See Texas Disposal, 2010 WL 
1838724, at *1. However, without cause to withdraw Texas‘s 
RCRA program or to commence proceedings, ―EPA‘s 
determination was a non-reviewable discretionary agency action.‖ 
Id. 
Also, as the Fifth Circuit has correctly held, RCRA, with no 
statutory deadline, does not present standards to guide the court. 
Therefore the agency‘s non-enforcement action is not subject to 
judicial review. Id. The only limit imposed upon the EPA here is 
that it must commence withdrawal proceedings after it has 
determined that a state is not in compliance. So therefore, even 
assuming that this court did find that there was a ―constructive 
determination‖ that New Union is in compliance with RCRA and 
that such a ―determination‖ is presumptively reviewable, that 
presumption is rebutted by lack of any substantive law to apply. 
See Texas Disposal, 2010 WL 1838724, at *1; 40 C.F.R. § 
271.23.There is no basis for this court to review EPA‘s non-
enforcement decision. 
B. This case is not entitled to judicial review until all 
administrative remedies have been exhausted 
under RCRA Section 3006 (e), and should be 
remanded back to the agency. 
Even assuming EPA‘s inaction was a ―constructive denial‖ of 
CARE‘s petition and a ―constructive determination‖ that New 
Union is in compliance, CARE would still not be entitled to 
judicial review by this court until all administrative remedies 
have been exhausted and until the court has a final agency action 
to review. ―The final agency action, for purposes of judicial 
review, occurs when the EPA issues its final decision, and all 
administrative remedies [have been] exhausted.‖ 40 C.F.R. § 
124.19(f)(1) (2010). New Union has not received a final decision 
from EPA, and the administrative remedies to correct any 
perceived deficiency in the program have not been exhausted. 
In Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, suit was commenced 
by public interest groups to challenge an agency‘s failure to 
promulgate a rule. 606 F.2d 1031, 1046–47 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The 
case was initially remanded back to the agency and district court 
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to conduct further rulemaking procedures. It was not until those 
procedures and proceedings were completed by the agency that 
the public interest groups could seek judicial review of the 
agency‘s final action. See Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 389 
F. Supp. 689, 702 (D.D.C 1974). 
At a maximum, this court should remand CARE‘s claims to 
the agency so all procedural requirements are exhausted under 
RCRA sections 7004 or 3006. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6926, 6974. Before 
making a determination that a state is no longer in compliance, 
the Administrator must issue an order with a time and place for a 
hearing, accompanied with the specific allegations of New Union‘s 
noncompliance to be considered at the hearing. 40 C.F.R. § 271.23 
(b)(1). Next, the state shall admit or deny the allegations put 
forth in the order.  Id. After an ―agency record‖ is compiled and 
the presiding officer recommends a decision, then the 
Administrator shall review the record and issue a decision. 40 
C.F.R. § 271.23 (b)(8)(i). ―If the Administrator concludes that the 
State has administered the program in conformity with the Act 
and regulations his decision shall constitute a final agency action 
within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 704.‖ 40 C.F.R. § 271.23 (b)(8)(ii) 
(emphasis added). 
In Ciba-Geigy, the court examined whether the petitioner 
had exhausted all administrative remedies since ―it directly 
related to the suitability of these matters for judicial review.‖ 
Ciba-Geigy Corporation v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 3 F.3d 40, 45 (2d 
Cir. 1993) (quoting Dettmann v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 
802 F.2d 1472, 1476 n. 8 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). First, the Second 
Circuit found the relevant statute authorized the court of appeals 
to review only the ―Administrator’s action. . .in issuing, denying, 
modifying, or revoking any permit.‖ 42 U.S.C. § 6976(b)(1) 
(emphasis added). Second, the court found that the EPA adopted 
regulations that expressly created exhaustion requirements, for 
instance requiring an appeal to the EAB as a prerequisite to 
seeking judicial review of final agency action. Id. As the 
petitioner had not exhausted all administrative remedies, judicial 
review was not warranted. 
Similarly, this matter is not ripe for judicial review because 
CARE failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.  Both the 
instant case and Ciba-Geigy have the same statute at issue, 
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RCRA section 7006. CARE argues that the court should lift the 
stay and proceed with judicial review pursuant to this section. 
However, RCRA section 7006 permits the court of appeals to 
review only final agency action, such as a final order. There has 
been no such order here. 
The complex administrative remedy for non-compliance laid 
out in the Code of Federal Regulations Section 271.23, governing 
procedures for withdrawing approval of state programs, 
demonstrates that there is no final agency action for CARE to 
seek judicial review. Under this section, the administrator may 
first order commencement of withdrawal proceedings on his or 
her own initiative or in response to a petition. Then, after an 
optional information investigation, the Administrator issues an 
order to commence proceedings. ―This order commencing 
proceedings under this paragraph shall fix a time and place for 
the commencement of the hearing and shall specify the 
allegations against the State which are to be considered at the 
hearing.‖ 40 C.F.R. § 271.23(b)(1). Not only did the Administrator 
not issue an order to trigger RCRA section 7006, the petitioners 
did not exhaust all administrative remedies. 
New Union has not received notice, has not received the 
statutorily required process, no order has been issued, and New 
Union has not been given an opportunity to come into compliance. 
Either this court needs to accept the ―constructive determination‖ 
as non-reviewable action within the agency‘s discretion or 
remand it back to EPA to exhaust the administrative remedies. 
V.  NEW UNION’S RCRA PROGRAM DOES NOT 
MEET THE CRITERIA FOR THE DRASTIC 
REMEDY OF WITHDRAWAL BECAUSE IT IS 
COMPLIANT WITH FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
AND ADEQUATELY ENFORCED. 
If this court nonetheless decides that CARE‘s petition to 
withdraw the New Union program is reviewable on the merits, 
the court should not require withdrawal of the program 
authorization. Withdrawal of a program‘s approval is an 
―extreme‖ and ―drastic‖ remedy that requires EPA to establish a 
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federal program to replace the state program. United States v. 
Power Eng’g Co., 303 F.3d 1232, 1038–39 (10th Cir. 2002).1 
CARE, as the party seeking withdrawal of the New Union 
program‘s authorization, bears the burden of demonstrating that 
New Union‘s program fails to comply with RCRA. 40 C.F.R. § 
271.23(b)(1) (2010). EPA‘s complex regulatory scheme for 
withdrawal mandates that CARE must prove New Union‘s 
program is noncompliant with the federal requirements in either 
its operation or its enforcement. 40 C.F.R. § 271.22(a)(2) and (3). 
Even then, the language of Section 271.22 is permissive, allowing 
EPA to use its best judgment as to whether withdrawal of a 
state‘s program is proper and justified. See 40 C.F.R. §271.22(a) 
(―[t]he Administrator may withdraw program approval when a 
State program no longer complies‖) (emphasis added).  CARE 
cannot meet this burden for New Union‘s program because New 
Union has not failed to operate or enforce its program despite the 
temporary budget constraints. So long as New Union‘s program is 
in compliance with the federal requirements, there is no basis for 
EPA to withdraw its approval of the program‘s authorization. 
A. New Union has not failed to issue permits or 
otherwise exercise control over activities that are 
required to be regulated. 
A state program may face withdrawal if a state fails to 
―exercise control over activities required to be regulated . . . 
including failure to issue permits.‖ 40 C.F.R. §271.22(a)(2)(i). New 
Union has not failed to exercise control over regulated activities 
or issue permits as required. See 40 C.F.R. § 271.14; 40 C.F.R. 
270 et. seq. (2010). New Union issued 125 state RCRA permits in 
2009 and anticipates issuing another 125 throughout the course 
of this year, more than enough to meet the demand of 50 annual 
permit applications and address the ongoing backlog. (Rec. doc. 5 
 
 1. Indeed, EPA approval of an authorized state program like New Union‘s is 
virtually never withdrawn. Out of the forty-six states that currently operate 
authorized RCRA programs, the extreme remedy of withdrawal has only been 
threatened in a single state, North Carolina. See William H. Rodgers, 
Environmental Law: Hazardous Waste and Substances, 4 ENVTL. L. § 7:22 
(2010); Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. Reilly, 938 F.3d 1390 (D.C. Cir. 
1991). 
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for 2009, p. 19). New Union is prioritizing its permit decisions in 
order to maximize its control over potentially harmful hazardous 
waste in a manner consistent with the RCRA‘s statutory scheme. 
It is doing this in the following order of priority: new facilities, 
facilities seeking to expand operations, facilities with permits 
that expired more than 15 years ago, and facilities that have the 
greatest potential for harm. Id. Continual permitting of facilities 
hardly constitutes a failure. 
Furthermore, the current pace of permitting in New Union 
cannot be said to create a regulatory gap. Facilities with expired 
permits still operate under the threat of permit revocation and 
enforcement. Facilities are required to maintain and continue 
current practices and comply with their expired RCRA permits, 
which remain in force beyond the expiration date. 40 C.F.R. § 
270.51(d). See Ciba-Geigy, 3 F.3d at 48. See also Wisconsin v. 
Hydrite Chem. Co., 2000 WL 35624540 (Wis. App. Cir. 2000) (a 
state court holding that a permit issued by the state RCRA 
program remains in effect under 40 C.F.R. § 270.51(d) for an 
unlimited period of time after expiration). Thus, New Union 
retains sufficient control over regulated activities to meet the 
requirements of the law. 
B. New Union’s RCRA program is adequately enforced. 
A program may also face withdrawal if it fails to enjoin 
violations, sue for and recover civil penalties, enforce criminal 
remedies, and ―immediately and effectively restrain‖ any person 
―engaging in unauthorized activity‖ that is endangering the 
public health. 40 C.F.R. § 271.16(a)(1) and (2) (2010). New Union 
has not ―failed to act on violations of permits,‖ ―failed to seek 
adequate enforcement penalties,‖ or ―failed to inspect and 
monitor activities.‖ 40 C.F.R. § 271.22(a)(3)(i)–(iii). The New 
Union DEP took six enforcement actions in 2009, including two 
civil actions requesting injunctive relief and civil penalties. (Rec. 
doc. 5 for 2009, p. 25). 
The New Union program has shown itself capable of policing 
the compliance of its permitees by implementing a program of 
periodic inspection that is designed to ferret out and curtail the 
most serious violations of permit requirements. Id. See also 40 
C.F.R. § 271.15(b) (Requirements for compliance evaluation 
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programs). The New Union DEP performed inspections of 150 
facilities during 2009 and prioritized these inspections to ensure 
that ―facilities that have reported unpermitted releases of 
hazardous waste into the environment‖ and facilities ―posing the 
greatest potential for harm to public health and the environment‖ 
are investigated and in compliance with the environmental laws. 
(Rec. doc. 5 for 2009, p. 22). Furthermore, EPA is explicitly 
authorized to retain the authority to enforce state permit 
requirements (as it does in New Union) and support New Union‘s 
enforcement scheme. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a); 40 C.F.R. §§ 271.16, 
271.19. New Union‘s program is not suffering from a failure in 
enforcement. 
EPA‘s original authorization of the New Union program 
meant that the program met the statutory requirements of RCRA 
as well as EPA‘s regulatory requirements for compliance and 
approval. (Rec. doc. 2, p. 1). To the extent EPA‘s decision to 
continue the New Union program is a ―constructive‖ 
determination that the program is in compliance, it affirms that 
New Union continues to meet this statutory and regulatory 
standard. New Union has continually provided EPA with honest 
information in its Annual Reports, which allow EPA to make the 
independent determination of whether the New Union program 
meets the federal criteria. (Rec. doc. 5 for 2000–09). EPA, in 
receipt of this information, has made the decision to continue to 
approve the New Union program. The permissive regulatory 
language means that EPA is allowed to decide if program 
authorization should be continued for the New Union program, 
and is not required to withdraw its authorization. This court 
must defer to EPA‘s rational interpretation of its own regulatory 
requirements and uphold the New Union program even if the 
court disagrees with that interpretation. Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. 
EPA, 919 F.2d 158,170 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
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VI.  TRANSFERRING THE REGULATION OF A 
SINGLE RAILROAD FROM THE NEW UNION 
PROGRAM DOES NOT CREATE A REGULATORY 
GAP THAT WOULD ALLOW EPA TO WITHDRAW 
THE PROGRAM’S APPROVAL 
The plain language and statutory history of RCRA make 
clear that Congress intended for states (like New Union) to act as 
the main authorities for RCRA implementation, with the federal 
government in a supportive partnership role. See 42 U.S.C. § 
6926. See also H.R. Rep. 1491, 94th Cong. 2nd Sess. 24 (1976) 
(―[s]tates are to have primary enforcement authority‖ for RCRA). 
CARE challenges this partnership with its claim that EPA is 
required to withdraw its approval for the New Union program. 
However, CARE‘s claim that EPA should withdraw New Union‘s 
program due to the passage of the 2000 Environmental 
Regulatory Adjustment Act represents a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the role of the federal authorities in RCRA‘s 
federal-state partnership scheme. 
A. The New Union 2000 Environmental Regulatory 
Adjustment Act amendment to the Railroad 
Regulation Act does not create a regulatory gap in 
the state program’s civil enforcement. 
CARE alleges that the 2000 amendments to the Railroad 
Regulation Act (―RRA Amendments‖), which transferred ―all 
standard setting, permitting, inspection, and enforcement 
authorities of the DEP under any and all state environmental 
statutes to the [New Union Railroad] Commission,‖ should force 
EPA to withdraw its approval of the New Union program because 
it ―withdraws railroad hazardous waste facilities from 
regulation.‖ (Rec. doc. 5 for 2000, pp. 103–05). However, New 
Union has simply amended which oversight body would enforce 
New Union‘s environmental laws, a move which does not create a 
regulatory gap or leave railroad facilities outside the reach of 
RCRA. 
The RRA had previously established a New Union Railroad 
Commission charged with regulating intrastate railroad freight 
rates, railroad tracks and rights of way, and railroad yards. The 
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2000 Amendments to the RRA clarify that oversight for railroad 
operations is vested in the Commission, including enforcement of 
the state environmental statutes. Id. This shift in jurisdictional 
authority does not equate to non-enforcement of the state‘s 
environmental laws. The Commission is a state agency, the 
Commissioners are state employees, and the chair of the 
Commission is appointed by the state legislature. Id. Thus, the 
environmental enforcement remains under the oversight of a 
state body. There is no requirement that any particular agency be 
the enforcement body, and enforcement of the statutory scheme 
by more than one state agency is contemplated by EPA. See 40 
C.F.R. 271.6(b) (2010) (requiring a State to describe and chart the 
―agency or agencies which will have responsibility for 
administering the program‖) (emphasis added). Allowing for local 
variance in the form of state enforcement is in keeping with 
RCRA‘s overall goal of encouraging State-run programs and 
maintaining state authority. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6902, 6926.See also 
H. R. Rep. 1491, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 24. 
However, even if the Commission fails to regulate, RCRA 
Section 3008 grants EPA the authority to enforce the New Union 
environmental program when the state fails to do so. 42 U.S.C. § 
6928(a)(1). If the New Union Railroad Commission chooses not to 
act, the EPA is not prohibited from bringing an independent 
enforcement action. United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 660 
F. Supp. 1236, 1245 (N.D. Ind. 1987). The majority of the courts 
support the position that federal enforcement is permissible when 
a state fails to enforce its program, even when the program is 
operating under EPA authorization. See Wykcoff Co., 796 F.2d 
1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1986); Power Eng’r Co., 303 F.3d at 1238.  
See also United States v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 
1054 (W.D. Wis. 2001). The Eighth Circuit‘s limitation in Harmon 
Indus. v. Browner is inapposite, as it relates to EPA‘s authority to 
―overfile‖ when a state has already taken action. 191 F.3d 894, 
901–02 (8th Cir. 1999). The legislative history of RCRA confirms 
that Congress anticipated federal authorities enforcing state 
programs if and when a state fails to do so. H.R. Rep. No. 94-
1491, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 31 (1976) (―[T]he Administrator is not 
prohibited from acting in those cases where the state fails to 
act‖). RCRA‘s federal-state partnership envisions this 
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol1/iss1/6
06 Intervenor 4/24/2011  2:32 AM 
186  PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 1 
 
simultaneous enforcement authority, which does not create a 
regulatory gap or a failure to implement New Union‘s 
environmental laws. 
B. The removal of state criminal enforcement for 
violations by railroads does not render the program 
inconsistent with federal law 
Similarly, the removal of state criminal penalties under the 
RRA Amendments does not subject the entirety of New Union‘s 
program to withdrawal as inconsistent with the federal 
requirement that the state ―shall have available‖ criminal 
enforcement remedies or otherwise enforce its program. 40 C.F.R. 
§§ 271.16, 271.22(a)(3). The RRA Amendments merely carve out a 
narrow exception to New Union‘s criminal enforcement of its 
environmental law by exempting a single railroad in the state. 
(Rec. doc. 5 for 2000, pp. 103–05). The New Union DEP is in no 
way constrained from pursuing criminal remedies against any 
other facility within its jurisdiction. Id. 
Despite this constraint on New Union‘s state criminal 
enforcement, the RRA Amendments have no effect on the ability 
of EPA to bring criminal sanctions for violations of the RCRA or 
New Union‘s environmental laws. RCRA Section 3008 has been 
interpreted to allow federal criminal prosecution for violations of 
state permits even where the state is operating an approved 
program in lieu of the federal program. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d); 
United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 
35, 43–45 (1st Cir. 1991) (state operation of a RCRA program 
does not remove the federal government‘s ability to prosecute 
under Section 3008 for violations of state law). See also Wykcoff 
Co., 796 F.2d at 1200–01 (discussing the federal-state partnership 
that allows for simultaneous federal enforcement of state law). 
Thus there is no prohibition on prosecution, nor is a regulatory 
gap created by the RRA Amendments. Concurrent federal law 
serves to ensure that all potential remedies are available against 
any violator of New Union‘s environmental law. 
VII. THE NEW UNION 2000 ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATORY ADJUSTMENT ACT’S 
REGULATION OF POLLUTANT X DOES NOT 
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RENDER THE NEW UNION PROGRAM SUBJECT 
TO WITHDRAWAL AS INCONSISTENT WITH 
RCRA OR IN VIOLATION OF THE COMMERCE 
CLAUSE. 
It is established under RCRA that states are free to 
implement environmental protections that are more stringent 
than the Federal standard. 42 U.S.C. § 6929. See also Blue Circle 
Cement, Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 27 F.3d 1499, 1504 (10th 
Cir. 1994). When it drafted RCRA, Congress explicitly intended 
not to foreclose state and local oversight of hazardous waste 
management that would be more stringent than the federal 
―floor.‖ Old Bridge Chems., Inc. v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. 
Prot., 965 F.2d 1287, 1292 (3d Cir. 1992). State programs are only 
subject to the condition that they be ―consistent‖ with the federal 
program. 42 U.S.C. § 6929. ―Consistency‖ is defined by regulation 
in Section 271.4, which states: 
To obtain approval, a State program must be consistent with the 
Federal program . . . 
a) Any aspect of the State program which unreasonably 
restricts, impedes, or operates as a ban on the free movement 
across the State border of hazardous wastes from or to other 
states for treatment, storage, or disposal at facilities 
authorized to operate under the Federal or approved State 
program shall be deemed inconsistent. 
b) Any aspect of State law or of the State program which has no 
basis in human health or environmental protection and 
which acts as a prohibition on the treatment, storage or 
disposal of hazardous waste in the State may be deemed 
inconsistent. 
40 C.F.R. § 271.4 (2010). New Union‘s regulation of Pollutant X is 
consistent with this regulation, and is therefore, by definition, 
consistent with the Federal program. 
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A. New Union’s regulation of Pollutant X does not 
operate as a ban on the free movement of hazardous 
wastes across the state border that would require 
EPA to withdraw its approval. 
New Union‘s regulation of Pollutant X provides, ―[a]ny person 
may transport Pollutant X through or out of the state . . . 
provided, however, that such transport shall be as direct and fast 
as is reasonably possible . . .‖ (Rec. doc. 5 for 2000, pp. 105–07). 
The New Union Hazardous Regulation Act can best be described 
as a limitation upon the manner in which Pollutant X can be 
transported through the State. See, e.g., Old Bridge Chems., 965 
F.2d at 1296 (upholding a New Jersey law that required 
transporters to label and identify hazardous waste). 
The New Union legislature has made a conscientious 
determination of how to best balance the needs of the interstate 
commerce system with the strong state interest in protecting the 
health and welfare of the citizens of the state and the New Union 
environment against a pollutant that has been determined to be 
among the most potent and toxic to human and environmental 
health. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 150–51 (1986). Any 
person is free to transport Pollutant X across the open state line. 
The only requirement is that they do so reasonably quickly. A 
statute which gives persons permission to transport Pollutant X 
through the state of New Union can hardly be construed as a 
―ban‖ or an ―unreasonable impediment‖ on the free flow of 
transport within the state. Therefore there is no basis for EPA‘s 
mandatory withdrawal of the New Union program‘s approval 
under Section 271.4(a). 
B. New Union’s regulation of Pollutant X has a basis in 
the protection of human health and does not act as 
a prohibition on the treatment, storage, or disposal 
of hazardous waste that would allow for EPA to 
withdraw its approval. 
Under the second regulatory prong, Section 271.4(b), 
withdrawal of program approval is discretionary with EPA. This 
means that even if the challenged state regulation is not based in 
the protection of human health and the environment and acts as 
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a prohibition on the treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous 
waste in the state, EPA is not required to take the drastic step of 
withdrawing a state program‘s approval. Id. 
Furthermore, the regulation‘s two prong test is conjunctive, 
which means that if the State regulation is either based in a valid 
protection of human or environmental health or if the state 
regulation does not constitute a total ban on hazardous waste 
treatment, disposal, or storage, EPA may not withdraw its 
program approval on the basis of inconsistency under Section 
271.4(b). Id. See also Blue Circle Cement, 27 F.3d at 1508 (―An 
ordinance which falls short of a total ban on encouraged activity 
will ordinarily be upheld so long as it is supported by a record 
establishing that it is a reasonable response to a legitimate local 
concern for safety or welfare.‖); Hazardous Waste Treatment 
Council v. Reilly, 938 F.3d at 1397 (upholding North Carolina‘s 
dilution standard and site-selection criteria when these laws did 
not effectuate a ―total ban‖ on a certain treatment method within 
the state). 
The New Union Act does not effectuate a ―total ban‖ or 
―prohibition‖ on ―the treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous 
waste‖ in the state. New Union allows short-term temporary 
storage of Pollutant X within the state. (Rec. doc. 5 for 2000, pp. 
105–07). Furthermore, the restrictions in the Hazardous 
Regulation Act restrict only Pollutant X, and do not constitute a 
ban on the disposal or treatment of ―hazardous waste‖ as a whole. 
Id. 
Finally, the restrictions on Pollutant X are supported by a 
record that establishes the legislation was based on legitimate 
concerns about human health and the environment. The 
Preamble to the legislation lays out the Legislature‘s findings 
that Pollutant X is among the most potent and toxic chemicals to 
human health and the environment as a basis for the regulation. 
Id. A state statute that does not effectuate a total ban on RCRA-
encouraged activities, is based in a concern for human health, 
and is consistent with the goals of RCRA is exactly the sort of 
permissible more-stringent regulation that is encouraged by 
RCRA approval of State programs. See 42 U.S.C. § 6926. 
C. New Union’s regulation of Pollutant X does not 
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violate the Commerce Clause 
Finally, CARE alleges that the New Union program should 
be withdrawn because the regulation of Pollutant X violates the 
dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution. U.S. CONST. Art. I, §8, cl. 3. It is true that courts 
have held RCRA‘s regulations do not preempt the dormant 
Commerce Clause‘s restrictions on states‘ ability to regulate and 
have indicated that the Commerce Clause may be more stringent 
than regulations such as Section 271.4. See Envtl. Tech. Council 
v. Sierra Club, 98 F.3d 774 (4th Cir. 1996). However, New 
Union‘s regulation of Pollutant X does not violate the dormant 
aspect of the Commerce Clause and does not provide a basis for 
EPA to withdraw the New Union program‘s approval. 
The Supreme Court has refined its Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence in the area of waste disposal and regulation. See 
United Haulers Assoc., Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste 
Mgmt Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (2007) (holding a ―flow control‖ 
ordinance which directed all trash haulers to deliver waste to a 
particular public facility was not an impermissible violation of the 
dormant Commerce Clause when it did not facially discriminate 
between in-state and out-of-state waste and the burdens on 
Commerce were outweighed by the public benefits). But see C & A 
Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994).  From 
this line of cases a fairly clear test has emerged. A state statute 
or local regulation is ―virtually per se‖ invalid and subject to strict 
scrutiny under the Commerce Clause when it facially 
discriminates against interstate Commerce by burdening out-of-
state waste generators differently than those in the state. Oregon 
Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of the State of Oregon, 
511 U.S. 93, 100–01 (1994). See also Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. 
Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992) (invalidating an Alabama statute that 
charged a fee for the disposal of hazardous waste generated out-
of-state). In contrast, non-discriminatory regulations that have 
only incidental effects on interstate commerce are valid unless 
―the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in 
relation to the putative local benefits.‖ Oregon Waste Sys., Inc., 
511 U.S. at 99 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 
142 (1970)). 
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The New Union Hazardous Regulation Act is not facially 
discriminatory against interstate commerce. There is no fee 
charged to enter the state or cross state lines while transporting 
Pollutant X, and no distinction drawn between in-state and out-
of-state producers of Pollutant X for purposes of enforcing the 
regulation. (Rec. doc. 5 for 2000, pp. 105–07). In-state producers 
of Pollutant X, regulated by New Union‘s DEP, are required to 
minimize and eventually cease its production—a regulation 
which does nothing to discriminate against out-of-state 
production. (ERAA Amd. 1, id.). Both in-state and out-of-state 
generators are required to dispose of their quantity of Pollutant X 
at an approved facility which, since New Union has no such 
facility, will naturally be a facility out-of-state. (ERAA Amd. 2, 
id.). Nothing in the statute or its legislative history gives any 
indication the statute was motivated by a desire to impose an 
impermissible burden on interstate commerce or to discriminate 
against out-of-state generators of Pollutant X. 
Thus, the New Union statute retains its presumption of 
validity and should be evaluated under the Pike test. Oregon 
Waste Sys., Inc., 511 U.S. at 99. Under the Pike test, state and 
local ordinances should be upheld when the incidental burden on 
commerce does not outweigh the benefits conferred to the 
citizenry. Id. See also Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt Auth., 
550 U.S. at 334. There are two potential incidental effects on 
interstate commerce from New Union‘s regulation of Pollutant X: 
first, out of state producers may be lightly burdened by the 
requirement to transport Pollutant X as directly and quickly as 
possible out of New Union, and second, certain companies who 
wish to open facilities to treat and dispose of Pollutant X from 
either in-state or out-of-state producers may be unable to do so. 
(Rec. doc. 5 for 2000, pp. 105-107). These concerns are easily 
outweighed by the state‘s strong interest in protecting its 
citizenry from one of the most potent and toxic chemicals to 
public health and the environment. Protection of public health 
from an immediate and severe threat is a strong enough state 
interest to allow even facially discriminatory legislation to stand. 
See Maine, 477 U.S. at 151. Non-discriminatory legislation such 
as the New Union Hazardous Regulation Act should be upheld. 
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There is no basis for EPA to withdraw New Union‘s program. 
It is adequately enforced, consistent with federal requirements, 
and compliant with both EPA‘s regulations and the dictates of the 
Commerce Clause. EPA and New Union should be permitted to 
continue to work together to achieve RCRA‘s overarching goal of 
federal and state cooperation to minimize hazardous waste and 
protect human health and the environment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this court should find for the State 
of New Union on any of the following three grounds: (1) this court 
lacks jurisdiction over the present dispute, (2) EPA‘s failure to act 
on CARE‘s petition is not a ―constructive denial‖ of that petition, 
or (3) New Union‘s hazardous waste program continues to meet 
RCRA‘s criteria for state program approval. 
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